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Abstract
It is difficult to find much to celebrate about the current conjuncture, marked as it is by deeply
destructive incoherence. The best that can be said is that we are in an interregnum. But I suggest that
today’s incoherence also includes productive and even transformative moments. I argue that
incoherence in global financial governance should be understood as productive in several respects. It is
creating and widening alternative spaces in which some of the values, practices, tools, objectives, and
goals associated with embedded liberalism can be rearticulated in a world in which there is no “order,”
American-led or otherwise. The silver lining of incoherence is that it creates space for experimentation
and innovation unconstrained by an overarching “ism.” Incoherence is creating exits or leakages from
noxious national and global policy environments, rendering it less poisonous than it would be in the
absence of ideational aperture and contestation, competing policies, institutions, networks, and poles of
power. The abdication by the US of its traditional role of global coordination and discipline, as exerted
under the post-war embedded liberal or the neoliberal American-led orders, is creating opportunities
for more permissive and varied “reembededness” and diverse forms of economic integration. The
emerging regime reflects neither your grandmother’s American-led order 1.0 or 2.0. In this morbid postAmerican interregnum there is no singular “ism” or “alternative order,” a fact that I do not mourn.

---------------------------*
Chapter prepared for Liberalism’s End? Populism, Authoritarianism, and the End of the American Order,
edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Jonathan David Kirshner. For invaluable comments on the paper I
thank George DeMartino; participants at a February 2020 seminar at Brown University’s Rhodes Center
for Economics and Finance; Erin Lockwood, the paper’s discussant at the June 2020 book workshop, as
well as all of the other participants at the workshop; Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein; and two
anonymous referees. I also thank Rachel Epstein for guidance on literature on embedded liberalism; and
Kaylin McNeil, Daniel Rinner, and Suraj Thapa for excellent research assistance.

The American-led international economic order that emerged from the second world war featured the
dominance of embedded liberal ideas and practices.1 This first American-led order involved, inter alia, a
unipolar global financial governance architecture organized around the dollar and the Bretton Woods
institutions (BWIs) and wide consensus around Keynesian principles of economic management. The
order featured domestic and international economic arrangements designed to promote growth, along
with mechanisms to protect domestic policy objectives (and the domestic economy itself) from external
pressures and volatility—especially those emanating from the financial sector.2 The ambitions and
compromises at the heart of this order reflected the widely held view, cemented during the second
world war, that economic nationalism was untenable and dangerous. The way forward required
cooperation and multilateralism as cornerstones of economic restoration and international peace.3 The
multilateralism was permissive, providing space for cross-national domestic policy heterogeneity.
Indeed, the agreement to disagree on matters of domestic policy was hardwired into the system
through Article IV of the newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The second American-led international order was characterized by the displacement of Keynesian
sensibilities by the neoliberal doctrine of Friedman and Hayek. The order reified markets, diminished the
role of the state as an economic actor and protector while installing a restrictive multilateralism that
promoted convergence to US policy and institutional norms. The neoliberal order placed a straightjacket
over national policy autonomy. The emergent neoliberalism reinforced existing US-led financial
unipolarity in ways that amplified the role and power of the BWIs and US-based financial actors and
interests. With notable exceptions, this order promoted the primacy of the hyper-liberalized American
financial model as the global ideal. The result was to slay embedded liberalism where its foundations
were weakest, and to put it on the defensive elsewhere.
A series of financial crises exposed internal contradictions in the neoliberal order. Unlike the demise of
the first order, the crises of the 1990s and the global crisis of 2008 (hereafter global crisis) threatened
not just the predominant economic model, but also the centripetal force of the global financial
governance architecture. The global crisis generated contradictory effects on the global financial
governance architecture and on neoliberalism, deepening fissures in the US-led regime while also
reinforcing the central role of the US.
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John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order," International Organization 36:2 (1982); John Gerard Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism Revisited:
Instiutions and Progress in International Economic Relations," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.),
Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
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Peter Katzenstein and Jonathan Kirshner, "Introduction," in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (eds.) (This
Volume), 2020; Mark Blyth, “The End of Social Purpose? Great Transformations of American Order,” in Jonathan
Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (eds.), (This Volume), 2020; Jonathan Kirshner, “Keynes and the Elusive Middle
Way,” in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (eds.) (This Volume), 2020. I follow Katzenstein and Kirshner,
“Introduction” (This Volume) in using the term embedded liberalism to refer to international and domestic aims.
3
Compromise and consensus are frequent descriptors of this order. While these terms capture important
attributes of the first order (especially in comparison with later periods) the terms conceal contestation, not least
by actors from the global south and east and those in the global north excluded from the rewards associated with
what many see as the “golden age of capitalism” (on the former, see Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of
Bretton Woods (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); on the latter, see e.g., Vincent Bevins, “The ‘Liberal World
Order’ Was Built With Blood,” New York Times, May 31, 2020; Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten
History of How Our Government Segregated America (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2017); Ira
Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century
America (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005).
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But where does this leave us today? The best that can be said is that we are in an interregnum in which
there is no consensus among economists and policymakers, no coherent, singular “ism” to guide policy
formation, or even a set of contending coherent systems of economic arrangements. Instead we
confront the simultaneous proliferation of a range of regimes that include kleptocratic capitalism, state
capitalism, social democratic multilateralism, neoliberal nationalism, neonationalism,4 and what I call
below “embedded populism.” An expanded set of diverse actors and institutions has joined the
conversation in global economic governance, pushing forward with ambitious new institutions and
initiatives. Many are encouraging; others certainly are not. Some of the initiatives threaten existing
arrangements, while others mimic practices pioneered by established actors and institutions. Still others
are establishing new networks beyond the direct control of established institutions.
Interregnums are unwelcomed by social scientists (and especially by economists), trained as we are to
value analytical fastidiousness, certainty, and coherence.5 I call that longing for coherence “ism-ism,”
reflecting the professional imperative to capture the proliferation of discordant tendencies in a neat
analytical package, some “ism” or other, so that we can impose analytical order. Today that new ism is
proving to be elusive. Instead, we confront the 2020s anxious about the shape of what is emerging and
what is to come. The current conjuncture provides few indications of a new ism. A post- embedded
liberal, post-neoliberal American order may yet emerge, but it is difficult today to see just where the
seeds of such an order lie.6 I maintain that the unease helps to explain the continuing appeal of what I
term the “continuity” view—the view that in the absence of a new, well-defined ism that nothing of
consequence has changed. Continuitists argue that we remain locked in the coherent (and coherently
damaging) neoliberal order.7 Academics and other observers are drawn to coherence, tidiness, the
orderliness of orders. Sustaining continuity requires the need to make the case--again and again--that
the US is still top dog.8 Proving this is taken as the rejoinder to the naivete of those (like me) who hold
less certain and messier views of the present and near future. To head off confusion let me say that
there is no doubt that the US has powerful legacy advantages and the Fed and the dollar still matter. But
that concession does not undermine the point that the world—well before the Covid-19 crisis--bore
little resemblance to the world of the second American order. Features of an order can persist long after
their order-giving capacities have evaporated.
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Mark Blyth, “Global Trumpism,” Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2016.
Not all social scientists celebrate fastidiousness. Most notably, and as I argue elsewhere (Ilene Grabel, Chapter 2,
When Things Don’t Fall Apart: Global Financial Governance and Developmental Finance in an Age of Productive
Incoherence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017)) and below, Albert Hirschman embraced messiness, experimentation,
and rejected grand plans and narratives. See George F. DeMartino, “Harming Irreparably: On Neoliberalism,
Kaldor-Hicks, and the Paretian Guarantee,” Review of Social Economy 73:4 (2015). On fastidiousness in economics,
see George F. DeMartino and Ilene Grabel "Irreparable Ignorance, Protean Power, and Economics," International
Theory 12:3 (2020).
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However, it is a safe bet to say that whatever emerges will be less centripetal, tidy and coherent, and less
centered on the US. This is a theme that cuts across most chapters in this volume. Mark Blyth, “The End of Social
Purpose?” in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (This Volume), 2020, is an exception insofar as he argues
that the order taking shape is of uncertain contours, but will nonetheless remain American because the dollar is
hardwired into the global financial system.
7
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart.
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For example, see Ruchir Sharma, “The Comeback Nation: U.S. Economic Supremacy Has Repeatedly Proved
Declinists Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2020.
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I view the current state of affairs as at loose ends. If this period of aperture has one dominant feature, it
is that it is “incoherent.”9 By incoherence I mean dissensus in the domain of ideas, and inconsistency in
the domain of policy. Incoherence is particularly acute in international economic governance, especially
as concerns finance, where we find evidence of fragmentation, conflict, experimentation, and
unevenness at the same time that we see the resilience of legacy practices. No “ism,” unless
“incoherence-ism” counts (I think it does not). Instead there is a proliferation of conflicting norms,
ideals, and strategies, and a profound and disturbing nostalgia for the tidiness of the embedded liberal
and neoliberal eras, even among their critics. After all, the playbook was clear. Advocates knew what
they were pushing for, while critics knew exactly what they were up against. Nostalgia perhaps stems
from the fact that the first order looks awfully good from where we now stand. In contrast, many fewer
are mourning the eclipse of the second order given the ravages associated with neoliberal convergence.
Writing during a previous interregnum, Gramsci spoke of the “morbid symptoms” that were readily
apparent as “the old is dying and the new cannot be born.”10 This is an apt description of the current
conjuncture.11 Our current morbidity includes a popular rejection of expertise, especially economics, a
profession that certainly shares responsibility for the contemporary crisis.12
It is difficult to find much to celebrate about the current conjuncture. Incoherence entails risks, some of
which are deeply threatening. The list of contemporary maladies is a long one. It includes bourgeoning
household, corporate, and public debt burdens which have created pervasive financial fragilities, the
assault on postwar multilateral traditions and institutions; the exhaustion of central bank arsenals; and a
trade war between the US and China that is recruiting them into currency wars not of their choosing. In
addition, the world’s central bank, the Federal Reserve (or Fed), faces populist resentment mobilized by
an erratic, churlish executive. Domestic and international politics have turned inward, nasty, and
conflictual in many contexts as a Polanyian double movement plays out.13 The countermovement has
many roots, but among the most important are the real and perceived damages associated with the
creation of a coherent internationally integrated system under the banner of US-led neoliberalism and
elite-led cosmopolitanism. The same cocktail of resentments fuels a variety of authoritarianisms and
illiberalisms. Progressive and retrograde deglobalization impulses have undermined the prospects of
regional and international cooperation, especially as concerns the provision of public goods and
protection of the global commons. These developments jeopardize essential international projects, such
as the pursuit of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the prospects of a
“New New Deal,” while substantially weakening collective responses to challenges in the global
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On this concept, see Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, pp. 15-17.
Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) p. 278.
11 The current period is unique in its particulars, but it is not without historical antecedents. Other interregna are
given by the interwar period and the 1970s. The latter is treated widely in this volume. The 1970s and the present
are marked by contestation; a high degree of uncertainty; and what Charles Lindblom referred to as “muddling
through” on the part of policymakers (Charles Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” Public
Administration Review 19:2 (1959); Charles Lindblom, “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through,” Public Administration
Review 39:6 (1979)). Today’s interregnum is different in several respects, including the absence of competing
“ism(s)”; a messy ideational and institutional landscape; and, as noted above, the rejection of expertise.
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On the latter point, see George F. DeMartino, “Special Issue on the Democratic Crisis and Responsibility of
Economists,” Forum for Social Economics 42:2 (2018), and the essays therein; DeMartino and Grabel, “Irreparable
Ignorance, Protean Power”; and relatedly, see Rawi Abdelal, “Of Learning and Forgetting: Centrism, Populism, and
the Legitimacy Crisis of Globalization,” in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (This Volume), 2020.
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Mark Blyth, “Global Trumpism.”
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commons, such as the refugee, environmental, and Covid-19 crises.14 The world economy is listing
toward another Great Depression as a consequence of the Covid-19 crisis, which is worsening already
vast national and cross–national inequalities in human development, while exposing and intensifying the
effects of racism and other forms of structural violence. It should also be said that the prospects for
global coordination in response to imminent financial crises are, in a word, dim.
All of this is deeply worrisome. But today’s incoherence also includes productive and even
transformative moments. In other work I have used the deliberately provocative term “productive
incoherence” to capture this idea.15 Productive incoherence is deeply indebted to Albert Hirschman’s
epistemic and theoretical commitments.16 Hirschman’s embrace of “possibilism” and his epistemic
commitment to uncertainty and humility led him to reject entirely the social scientist’s penchant for prenarrating the future. Hirschman also emphasized the vital role of experimentation, pragmatic problem
solving in response to unforeseen or underestimated challenges, the centrality of learning by doing and
from others, and the virtues of messiness over real and contrived coherence and parsimony. Hirschman
urged us to look at processes of change in the small, and to interrogate grand narratives and the
tendency to valorize epochal visions of institutional and ideational change.17 These are key features of
what I have elsewhere termed a “Hirschmanian mindset.”18 This mindset informs the claims I advance in
this essay.19
Incoherence in global financial governance should be understood as productive in several respects.
Incoherence is creating and widening alternative spaces in which some of the values, practices, tools,
objectives, and goals associated with embedded liberalism can be rearticulated in a world in which there
14

The failed response to the Covid-19 crisis in the US is a perfect illustration of destructive incoherence. Balanced
budget rules at the state and municipal levels constrain their fiscal capacity and cancel out much of the effects of
federal expansionism. At the same time the absence of federal leadership in implementing closures and openings
of schools and workplaces, and in securing ventilators and personal protection equipment, have led to damaging
deficiencies in constraining the virus. Nonetheless the US federal government and the Fed implemented expansive
economic and social protection programs, such as the extension of unemployment compensation to “selfemployed” gig economy workers, some features of which are consistent with embedded liberalism, which may
stick long after the pandemic has passed. National governments in many European contexts went much further in
the direction of expansive, universal social protection.
15
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart.
16
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapter 2.
17
John Gerard Ruggie’s contribution (“Corporate Globalization and Its Consequences: Shifting Governing Norms,”
in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (eds.) (This Volume), 2020)) echoes Hirschmanian themes, highlighting
gradual, uneven evolution as concerns transnational norms and evolving standards.
18
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart.
19
The concept of productive incoherence--and Hirschman’s key commitments, as outlined above--resonate with
Lindblom’s muddling through. Indeed, Hirschman and Lindblom coauthored an essay that highlights the
overlapping nature of their approaches to policy (Albert O. Hirschman and Charles Lindblom, “Economic
Development, Research and Development and Policy Making: Some Converging Views,” in A Bias for Hope: Essays
on Development and Latin America, edited by Albert O. Hirschman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1971[1962])). Productive incoherence also resonates with John Kingdon’s “garbage can theory of politics,” in which
ideas that have been in the ether for some time can become influential when windows of opportunity occasionally
open (John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternative, and Public Policies (New York: Harper/Collins, 2nd edition, 1995)). Some
may incorrectly see in productive incoherence an echo of Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction.” Creative
destruction is embedded in a kind of neoliberal, Darwinian mindset that suggests an impulse and mechanism
toward progress, whereas productive incoherence suggests no such trajectory.
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is no “order,” American-led or otherwise. The silver lining of incoherence is that it creates space for
experimentation and innovation unconstrained by an overarching “ism.” Incoherence is creating what
we might think of as exits or leakages from a noxious national and global policy environment, rendering
it less poisonous than it would be in the absence of ideational aperture and contestation, competing
policies, institutions, networks, and poles of power. The abdication by the US of its traditional role, as
exerted under American orders 1.0 and 2.0, is creating opportunities for more permissive and varied
“reembededness” and diverse structures of economic integration. Agile, pragmatic, ideationally elastic,
networked actors, and those that enjoy high levels of policy autonomy are in the best position to thrive
in an environment of incoherence.20 China is the exemplar in this connection. The evolving and
reinvented BWIs, and even many entirely new players in the financial landscape, are stepping forward
with strategies that defy theoretical encapsulation.
To be clear: my intervention here should not be read as deriving from an “optimistic” disposition driving
us to see just the upside and not also the downside of the current conjuncture--a point to which I return
later. But I do seek to push back against what Hirschman identified as “futilism”—the common social
scientific indulgence to pronounce on the inadequacies in emerging experiments in economic
arrangements. Hirschman pointed out that such narratives have performative force, undermining
initiatives that might otherwise flourish . My goal is to explore spaces where aperture and agency are
emerging as sites of possibility. The crumbling of the American financial order is providing many such
spaces, even while it creates serious risks. An unscripted world provides opportunities for actors to
carve out new roles--for better or worse.
In this essay I examine the contradictory implications of this era of incoherence for rearticulations of
embedded liberalisms in the context of global governance that is more heterogeneous, pluripolar,
resilient, and permissive. I focus only on global financial governance, encompassing institutions, policies,
and practices, because this is where my interests and expertise lie and because, for several reasons, it is
particularly germane to discussions of embedded liberalisms. Global financial governance was a crucial
supporting pillar for both embedded liberalism and neoliberalism. Transformations and conflict in the
arena of global finance were central to the unraveling of post-war embedded liberalism and to the
emergence and ultimate fracturing of neoliberalism. But I argue that incoherence in global financial
governance is also creating opportunities for reconstituted embedded liberalisms. This is the case even
though financial incoherence also incorporates retrograde or destructive impulses. The emerging regime
reflects neither your grandmother’s embeddedness nor her liberalism—but it may achieve some of the
results of her embedded liberalism nonetheless.21
I do not want to be misunderstood as suggesting that the two American-led international economic
orders were internally consistent, unified, or comprehensive, whereas the current moment is uniquely
marked by incoherence. To a large degree, order is something we impose on regimes ex post through
20

Peter Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert (eds.), Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
21
It bears mention that rearticulations of embedded liberalisms are occurring on the intrastate level. For example,
in the US many states and cities have made commitments to the Paris Climate Accord and living wages. Other
examples include Medicare programs in Massachusetts; policies on immigration, the environment, and private
prisons in California. On California, see Francis Gavin, “California Dreaming: The Crisis and Rebirth of American
Power in the 1970s and Its Consequences for the World Order,” in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (This
Volume), 2020; and protective policies enacted by US states and municipalities during the Covid-19 crisis. Much of
the New Deal architecture was modeled on successful state level initiatives. James K. Galbraith, “Can Sanders Do
It?” Project Syndicate, January 31, 2020.
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our analytical schema—they are not simple, obvious, objective features of the arrangements we
designate as an order.22 Moreover, when making comparisons between the present and prior eras we
should remember that much scholarship has amply demonstrated that the emergence of embedded
liberalism and neoliberalism involved contestation, contradiction and exclusion that were never
overcome. These regimes unfolded unevenly over long periods, and they co-existed with other “isms” in
a heterogeneous global landscape.23 Coherence is always a matter of degree; it is not a matter of
present-absent. In my view, these earlier eras were coherent only in comparison to the present period.
Expert understandings, policy practice, and institutional design were significantly guided by an
overarching “ism” that established a logic of appropriateness and structured choices, even if the logic
was widely violated in practice. Coherence is typically more of an aspiration than an accomplishment.
Social scientists and social engineers tend toward visions that are analytically neat and clean. These
visions exceed in parsimony, tidiness, and purity the degree to which these attributes are achieved in
practice. The question, “is there a coherent project?” is just as important as, “is there a coherent regime
in practice”?
The crises of neoliberalism and the beginning of the end of the second American order
The crises that swept through countries of the global south and east (hereafter the developing world) in
the 1990s had paradoxical effects on neoliberalism, global financial governance, and the second US-led
international economic order. Most importantly the crises of the 1990s, especially the East Asian crisis
(hereafter Asian crisis), laid the groundwork for the ideational, policy, and institutional transformations
that deepened significantly during the crisis of 2008. One critical effect was the opening of space for the
rearticulation of central pillars of embedded liberalism.24
In the first instance the Asian crisis solidified neoliberalism. The SBAs of the crisis dismantled key
attributes of the developmental state model.25 But the crisis also induced cracks in the neoliberal
consensus. Prior to the Asian crisis, the IMF was poised to enshrine capital flow liberalization in its
Articles of Agreement. The Asian crisis put paid to that effort. Moreover, and despite the neoliberal
tenor of the times, some countries stubbornly maintained capital controls, with notable success. 26
Partly in response, the Asian crisis precipitated the beginning of a begrudging, uneven reevaluation of
capital flow liberalization.27
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Albert O. Hirschman, “The Search for Paradigms as a Hinderance to Understanding,” World Politics 22:3 (1970).
Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, “Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways,”
Global Networks 10:2 (2010); Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods; Eric Helleiner, “The Life and
Times of Embedded Liberalism: Legacies and Innovations Since Bretton Woods,” Review of International Political
Economy 26:6 (2019). Treatments of embedded liberalism in Sheri Berman (“The Social Democratic Order and the
Rise and Decay of Democracy,” in Jonathan Kirshner and Peter Katzenstein (This Volume), 2020) and Peter
Gourevitch (“The Construction of Compromise and the Rise and Fall of Global Orders),” in Jonathan Kirshner and
Peter Katzenstein (This Volume), 2020) and the first American order in Blyth (“The End of Social Purpose?”)
underscore the messiness, contestation, and contingency that is underappreciated in most accounts.
24
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapter 3.
25
European SBAs after 2008 had similar effects on remaining vestiges of embedded liberalism.
26
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapters 3 and 7; Ilene Grabel, “Averting Crisis? Assessing Measures to
Manage Financial Integration in Emerging Economies,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 27:3 (2003).
27
Ilene Grabel, “Not Your Grandfather’s IMF: Global Crisis, ‘Productive Incoherence’ and Developmental Policy
Space,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 35:5 (2011).
23
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The Asian crisis had contradictory effects on the BWIs, especially the IMF.28 The crisis was ultimately
costly to the IMF insofar as its crisis response led developing economies to implement strategies to
escape its orbit through self-insurance programs. The combination of a curtailed geography and
widespread condemnation of institutional performance undermined the IMF’s legitimacy and reduced
the material resources at its disposal.
The Asian crisis also renewed interest by developing economy policymakers in the creation of
institutions that supplement and even substitute for the BWIs. The Asian Monetary Fund, proposed in
the summer of 1997, failed to materialize. Nevertheless it had powerful effects in the region and across
developing economies more broadly. Indeed, and as I argue below, the roots of today’s more pluripolar
global financial architecture lie here, in the Asian crisis.
The crises of the 1990s also induced policymakers to create informal financial governance networks. This
informal architecture of networked financial governance evolved and broadened during the global
crisis.29
The brief history sketched above suggests a degree of aperture that was not in evidence over the past
several decades. The global crisis deepened and widened that aperture in numerous respects. I draw
attention here to those aspects of global financial governance in the present period that bear most
directly on the fate of embedded liberalisms. These include the eclipse of the US-centric neoliberal
financial model; an expanded central bank toolkit; the resurrection of capital controls; the hollowing out
of the BWIs in a more crowded landscape; and trends pointing in the direction of deglobalization,
reglobalization, new multilateralisms, and “networked bilateralisms. These trends do not all line up—
instead, they can and do sometimes compete and conflict.”30 My chief argument is that the evolving,
incoherent nature of global financial governance can support the financial pillars of rearticulated,
heterogeneous embedded liberalisms, along with other and less appealing isms.31 The diverse policy
responses to the Covid-19 crisis provide a window into the operation of the incoherent “order,”
revealing both its productive and destructive potential.
The eclipse of the US order, and the rise of hybridized financial models
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Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapter 5.
Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapter 4; Eric Helleiner, “Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial
Governance,” Global Summitry 2:1 (2016). Jonathan Luckhurst, “The G20 and Ad Hoc Embedded Liberalism:
Economic Governance Amid Crisis and Dissensus,” Politics & Policy 40:5 (2012)--too uncriticially--identifies these
networks, especially the G-20, as a space for “ad hoc embedded liberalism.”
30
The issue of how to think about the nature of economic integration today is complex when it comes to China. I
return to this matter later.
31
Discussion in this section draws on Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapters 3-7; Ilene Grabel, “The Upside
of a Messier Global Financial Architecture,” Current History 117:802 (2018); Ilene Grabel, “Continuity, Discontinuity
and Incoherence in the Bretton Woods Order: A Hirschmanian Reading,” Development and Change 50:1 (2019).
The argument that elements of embedded liberalism might be resurrected can be understood as a process of
“bricolage,” by which is meant taking already existing (and, in some instances, dormant) ideational and
institutional bits and pieces and recombining them in novel ways to create something new but that echoes the
past. There are elements of bricolage in the analysis by Sheri Berman (This Volume). On the concept of bricolage,
see Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1986); and for a discussion of its
application to the institutional landscape see James H. Mittleman, “Global Bricolage: Emerging Market Powers and
Polycentric Governance,” Third World Quarterly 34:1 (2013).
29
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The global crisis tarnished claims for the superiority and universality of the liberalized, liquid US financial
model. The crisis validated the views of critics of the model in the US, China, and elsewhere who had
long identified the failings of “light touch” financial regulation.32
The hegemony of the neoliberal financial model was threatened by the sharp divergence between the
performance of the US and Europe during the global crisis and that of many developing economies, and
by pivotal retreats by the US in financial governance. A large set of developing economies navigated the
challenges of rapid growth, inflation, and the currency appreciation and asset bubbles caused by large
capital inflows. Many developing economies facing these favorable conditions had messy, hybridized
financial systems. These systems combined financial openness with stringent regulation, including
capital controls. Policymakers were attuned to and had the ability to adjust financial regulations and
close channels of evasion. Robust mechanisms influenced credit allocation through networks of public
and private institutions.
Emboldened by their superior performance, developing economy policymakers exploited the global
crisis to call for alternatives to a US-based financial order. The most widely publicized salvo was the 2009
essay by Xiaochuan Zhou, Governor of the People’s Bank of China. The Chinese also downgraded US
government debt in 2011 and 2013, something that would have been unthinkable just a few years prior,
and took steps to internationalize the RMB. Since 2015 China has promoted development of a Cross
Border International Payments System (CIPS) as an alternative to SWIFT (Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication), the West’s dominant international financial messaging system
used widely for cross-border payments.33 China’s monetary and financial internationalization have been
far less impactful to date than some predicted. Moreover and paradoxically, some Chinese initiatives
have actually confirmed the pivotal role of the dollar in international finance. (In point of fact, the dollar
has outperformed most predictions regarding its role as an international money since the global crisis.)
But this is to be expected given both the legacy advantages that the dollar and US institutions enjoy and
the cautious approach that marks China’s policy strategy.
Chinese policymakers in general have taken an experimental, uneven, incoherent, impulsive, and quasiKeynesian approach to finance.34 For instance the government has used offshore markets as sites of
experimentation, while also conducting experiments in national and local markets on the mainland.35
We can understand Chinese policy as being both backward and forward looking. A number of initiatives
involve practices and instruments associated with neoliberalism and financialization, such as securitized
lending and shadow banking.36 In 2018, for instance, the government announced an ambitious 3-5 year
plan to liberalize financial services, including international capital flows. This is surprising given the
fragilities that such practices necessarily induce, especially in an economy already overstretched by
domestic and foreign overlending. Nonetheless these measures are consistent with the overall
32

Jonathan Kirshner, American Power After the Financial Crisis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
Miriam Campanella, “Far-Reaching Consequences of US Financial Sanctions,” Robert Triffin International (Turin
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messiness of China’s approach. The government typically introduces new controls even as it liberalizes,
especially during moments of financial and political volatility. The start-stop of RMB liberalization in late
2015-early 2016 is one such example. Unlike the US’ ideological commitment to financial openness,
China’s initiatives are best viewed as pragmatic, ad hoc, and inconsistent innovations in financial
governance in a state that is increasingly challenged by competing demands and pressures. The political
crackdown on Hong Kong in 2020 exemplifies the internal tension between pressures for change and the
commitment to maintain control. Repression off the mainland (coupled with early efforts to hide the
spread of the coronavirus) has seriously undermined trust in China, domestically and internationally.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and numerous other cross-border investment and aid initiatives are
outgrowths of China’s muscular state capitalist model. The model reflects embedded liberal “adjacent”
aims on the one hand, and realpolitik on the other. The former is seen in prioritization of commitments
to financial and broader economic stability, high levels of policy autonomy, real sector and employment
growth, and maintenance of export markets. Realpolitik involves securing control over natural resources
through an ambitious vision of reglobalization that places the country at the center of a hub and spoke
model of global integration, cultivating political allies, crushing dissent in Hong Kong, using the Covid-19
crisis as an excuse to increase surveillance, and stepping into the void created by the withdrawal of the
US from its traditional global role. Chinese policymakers do not share the US presumption that its model
should be universalized, though there is ample evidence of significant ambition and rivalry with the US
model and the dollar.37
The trade and currency wars unleashed by the Trump administration are providing additional
momentum to the case against US economic leadership, especially as these conflicts unfolded in 2019
and early 2020.38 The erratic nationalism of the Trump administration widened the void in global
economic governance opened by the Obama administration’s refusal to accept China’s invitation to join
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member in 2015. Moreover, the failed,
chaotic, and inward looking response by the US to the Covid-19 crisis moves it even further away from
any semblance of global leadership.
There are a range of early stage innovations and blue sky discussions among US foes and allies that aim
to gradually reduce the dependence on the dollar and to provide some protection from the Trump
administration’s weaponization of finance and trade relations, such as its (ab)use of sanctions.39 Among
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US allies, former Bank of England governor Mark Carney proposed far reaching adjustments that would
demote the role of the dollar.40 He argued that the world’s reliance on the dollar “won’t hold” and that
the IMF should manage a multipolar system of currencies.41
The fractured hegemony of the US model has created space for a pluriculture of financial models,
features of which are consistent with embedded liberalism. China’s “model” is the most notable of these
alternatives, but we should keep an eye on other inchoate initiatives in South Korean, Indian, Malaysian,
and Islamic finance, which represent alternative modes of organizing finance.42 We should also keep in
mind that even in the case of China, the term model should be treated cautiously as it suggests a degree
of orderliness and consistency that is apparent mostly in hindsight.
Empowered Central Banks, Revived Capital Controls, and the Hollowing out of the BWIs
Central banks scrambled to respond to the uncertain dimensions and geography of the global crisis by
drawing on a broad range of tools to stabilize markets, support financial and non-financial firms, and
inject liquidity into the financial system.
What became known as “unconventional monetary policies” became a norm for central banks in many
advanced economies (AEs) during the global crisis. That inflation targeting fell away as the primary
objective of the central bank agenda in AEs, during the global (and the Covid-19) crisis, is less indicative
of a change in priorities or ideas than it is of the deflationary environment.43 At the same time central
banks in developing economies and other national contexts began to target financial stability and asset
bubbles and the reduction of systemic risk through macroprudential policies.44 It also became more
acceptable for central banks in AEs and developing economies to target the exchange rate to protect
exports and employment from currency appreciations fueled by foreign capital inflows. Central banks
created large, broad, ad hoc international liquidity networks through vast swap lines. Swap agreements
were driven by a variety of concerns, including financial stability, but also domestic bank exposure,
geopolitical considerations, national interest, and export market protection.
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The “new normal” for central banks is unconventional monetary policies in an environment marked by
erratic executives, low and even negative interest rates, inter-bank conflict reminiscent of the 1930s,
disruptions in international trade, and contagious crises. Indeed the 2019 Jackson Hole central banker
conference focused on the strange new environment.45 Populists have also attacked the credibility and
independence of central banks as part of broader attacks on expertise.
Central banks in AEs have responded to the Covid-19 crisis with multipronged, aggressive and, in many
cases, innovative policy responses that made them the lender of last resort for the financial and real
sector. The banks have bought unlimited amounts of Treasury bonds; signed swap agreements; created
temporary liquidity facilities for central banks not party to swap agreements; supported the credit needs
of small, medium, and especially large firms; and backstopped banks, municipal and corporate bond
markets, commercial paper, and repurchase markets. During the global and Covid-19 crises central
banks pivoted in the direction of “embedded central banking,” deploying new tools and attacking new
targets, including real sector conditions and financial instability.
I should note as an aside that beyond the policy imperatives driven by the global and Covid-19 crises,
central bank officials (such as those at the Fed and the ECB) are increasingly emphasizing the importance
of developing new tools to “green” monetary policy. The goal is to use monetary policy to support a
transition to a low-carbon economy and to build climate risk assessments into lending decisions.46 IMF
Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva made similar calls for the IMF to place climate risk at the
centerpiece of its work.47 Central bankers have also recently begun to speak openly about racism and
inequality and speculated in public fora about whether and how to use the tools at their disposal to
respond to these inequities.48
Capital controls were a defining feature of the first American-led order. Capital controls were legitimized
by the then dominant Keynesianism. Capital controls fell out of favor in the 1970s and remained so
during the long neoliberal era. But ideas and practices began to evolve during the crises of the 1990s. As
the global crisis emerged, capital controls were quickly re-legitimized.49
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A wide range of developing economies used diverse capital controls to slow the tide and dampen the
negative spillover effects of large capital inflows. Examples of countries that used controls for this
reason include Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Uruguay. Other countries,
including Ukraine, Iceland, Indonesia, Greece, Cyprus, and Argentina, used capital controls to mitigate
the effects of crisis-induced capital outflows. Formerly denigrated as a policy tool of choice of the weak
and misguided, capital controls were normalized as a legitimate tool of prudential financial
management. Particularly notable in this context is the behavior of the IMF. It prescribed capital
controls to both borrowing and non-borrowing economies during the global crisis, and the resulting
initiatives were validated by the credit rating agencies. The deeply conservative neoclassical heart of the
economics profession followed the lead of those IMF researchers, who domesticated the idea of capital
controls by referring to them as a “legitimate part of the policy toolkit.”
The restoration of capital controls has by no means been consistent, as recent experiences in Argentina
(2018-19), Ecuador (2019), and Lebanon (2019) underscore. As with most rebranding exercises there is
also uncertainty about whether the new framing will prove sufficiently sticky, especially in the context of
tensions and countervailing impulses at the IMF and elsewhere. The emergence of illiberal governments
that pander to capital owners, and a resilient bias against state management of economic flows among
many economists who were trained and cut their professional teeth during the neoliberal era, also
threaten the endurance of controls. But it is most unlikely that we will see a return to the reification of
capital flow liberalization given the widespread, productive use of capital controls during the global
crisis. IMF Chief Economist Gita Goinpath now discusses controls used in “normal times” as prudential
measures in what she terms an “Integrated Policy Framework.”50 Those of us who remember the IMF
effort to banish capital controls for good as recently as the early 2000s can’t help but take note of the
sea change in thinking that this statement reveals.
The rethinking of capital controls marks a decisive shift back toward the vision of BWI architects Keynes
and Dexter White. The implications for the emergence of embedded liberalisms are profound.51 Most
immediately, the restoration of capital controls provides a degree of policy autonomy as developing
economies shoulder the effects of currency depreciations, capital flight, financial crisis, and severe
economic and social dislocation associated with the Covid-19 crisis. Indeed, IMF staff recently
highlighted the role that capital controls can play in this context.52 This is in keeping with the insulating
and supportive role that capital controls played in the embedded liberal era. Beyond the serious
challenges associated with the Covid-19 crisis, capital controls are an important component a “Global
Green New Deal” in conjunction with the 2030 SDG agenda.53
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President Trump’s Treasury team and his appointments to the IMF and the World Bank display the
administration’s deep hostility to multilateral organizations, and its hope to weaken the institutions
from within. In a 2017 speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (then) US Treasury official David
Malpass asserted that “Now is an opportune time to discuss…the rapid increase in
globalism…multilateralism has gone substantially too far.”54 In 2018 Malpass urged the Inter-American
Development Bank not to hold its annual meeting in China in 2019. He made clear that the
administration was increasingly discomforted by China’s growing influence at the multilateral
development banks. The IADB again became a flashpoint in the Trump campaign to ring fence China in
2020. The administration appointed a hardline China critic, Mauricio Claver-Carone, to serve as
president the institution. In 2020 Malpass, by then President of the World Bank, skipped the annual
World Economic Forum. This was widely seen to reflect the Trump administration’s go it alone
approach. So was Malpass’ veto of the word “multilateralism” in the collective statement issued at the
G7 2019 summit.55 As with his predecessor, Malpass also appears to be hostile to large scale crossborder infrastructure projects that might involve co-financing with China.
The administration’s attack on multilateralism is also reflected in a 2019 decision to block an IMF quota
increase and redistribution of voting rights. Observers speculated that the administration’s move to
block quota reform sought to prevent China from garnering more voting power.56 The US Treasury
blocked efforts to increase the capacity of the IMF during the Covid-19 crisis by allocating a large new
tranche of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to members.57 The Trump administration’s decision to halt
funding to the WHO during the Covid-19 crisis reflects the strength of its anti-globalist impulses and the
commitment to punish a multilateral institution for (a real and an exaggerated) tilt towards China.58
To sum up, the present conjuncture is a time of uncertainty at and for the BWIs and their roles in
economic governance. There are ample signs of evolution in ideology and strategies, as we see most
clearly in the case of capital controls. The new stance toward prudential financial management is a
necessary though insufficient condition for the reconstruction and sustenance of embedded liberal
strategies. In addition, a new and as of yet underdeveloped open-minded approach to industrial policy
might ultimately prove to be just as consequential (see fn51); as could consideration of a Global Green
New Deal. The BWI’s might become more relevant in the Covid-19 crisis, especially as they are called
upon and have begun to respond tepidly to the needs of low-income countries. Nonetheless, the BWIs
and other multilateral institutions face hostility from the US, their primary sponsor over the long postWWII period. The Trump attack is intended to hollow out the BWIs, in part to deny China and other
developing economy competitors a foothold to extend their role in global economic affairs. But the
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inconsistent, volatile Trumpian approach is short-sighted and likely to fail. Not least, it is incentivizing
friend and foe alike to create new institutions and linkages that circumvent and constrain US influence
over financial flows and financial governance. Moreover, Trump’s timing could not be worse. The
uncertainty around the BWIs provides possibilities for more permissive and varied multilateralisms at a
time when at least some developing economies have the resources and backbone to withstand
Washington’s threats. We see clear signs that the shape of multilateralism is being contested and
rethought. Since the global crisis a new, more densely populated ecosystem of financial governance has
emerged, which was already threatening the privileged place of the US even before Trump’s election.59
A more heterogeneous institutional landscape
Reserves accumulated after the Asian crisis and robust developing economy performance during the
global crisis provided the means to support innovations in financial governance architectures. For
institutions whose existence pre-dates the global crisis there was expansion in the scale of activity,
geographic reach, and the introduction of novel mechanisms. New developing economy institutions
were also created during the crisis, a few focusing on counter-cyclical support, others on development
finance, and a handful doing both. Many of the institutions signed cooperation agreements with one
another. A subset of these institutions hews to the Bretton Woods model in various respects while
others formally and informally even link their decisions to IMF surveillance programs. Others deploy
entirely different models, disbursement criteria, approaches to surveillance, and extend loans in local
currencies. In contrast to its opposition to the Asian Monetary Fund proposal, the IMF has been
encouraging the expansion of and connections among these institutions and between them and the
IMF. This engagement surely stems from several factors—namely, institutional self-preservation in a
world of hollowed-out and contested multilateralism and recognition that the IMF’s resources are
inadequate in the face of a turbulent financial horizon.60
The new arrangements do not coalesce around a singular, grand new global architecture that might
replace the foundering BWIs. Indeed, they are explicitly not intended to do so. Nor do they yet amount
to a potent challenge to the financial power of the USA and other leading AEs. But displacement is the
wrong standard against which to measure their significance. Instead, we are observing productive
incoherence in the expansion of disparate, overlapping, and interconnected institutions that
complement the BWIs. Taken together, they are diversifying the financial landscape and introducing the
possibility of a transition to a more complex, decentralized, multi-tiered, pluripolar global financial and
monetary system. The initiatives are complicating the terrain on which the BWIs operate—and that’s a
good thing. A more densely populated, pluripolar global financial governance architecture is more likely
to be tolerant or supportive of experimentation and a diversity of economic models, and to enable a
variety of embedded liberalisms. That kind of tolerance is typically absent under an architectural
monoculture that exerts a gravitational pull towards a single idealized model. Today, new players hold
diverse ideas about policy autonomy, the role of the state in the economy, and the importance of
financial stability. Is this inconsistency disconcerting? I propose instead we assess the emerging
incoherence with Hirschmanian sensibilities, or via Ostrom’s complimentary arguments for
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polycentrism.61 We should also keep in view related arguments in complexity theory concerning the
benefits of heterogeneous, adaptive systems and the dangers of monocultures and centripetal
systems.62
During the first and second American-led order lending by the BWIs amplified and transmitted economic
policy norms and reinforced the role of the US in global financial governance. Today, China’s
international aid, investment, and lending magnify the country’s role in reshaping the landscape of
global development finance. The stock of outstanding loans made by the China Development Bank alone
was US$1.6 trillion in 2017, much larger than loans by the World Bank. Outstanding loans by China grew
from approximately zero in 2000 to more than US$700 billion today; it’s the world’s largest official
creditor, more than twice as big as the World Bank and IMF combined.63 And there is evidence that even
these figures understate China’s international lending.64 Many observers have compared the BRI to the
Marshall Plan. But it is important to note that 90% of Marshall Plan funding involved foreign aid, not
loans.65 The Belt and Road funding comes from a variety of sources including profit-seeking private
entities.66 The Marshall Plan gave liberal markets a decisive role, whereas the BRI does not.67
During the global crisis the Chinese government positioned itself as a savior of multilateralism. The
government was alone among the BRICS in its decision to provide finance to the European Financial
Stability Facility during the Eurozone crisis. The government also signaled its commitment to
multilateralism and Chinese-led reglobalization during the crisis by launching the AIIB, BRI, other loan
and aid programs, the CIPS, and playing a leading role in the financial structures developed by the BRICS.
Chinese President Xi Jinping launched a robust defense of globalization and multilateralism at the World
Economic Forum in Davos in 2017.68 Since then Chinese officials have seized the stage on many
occasions to defend multilateralism (which in practice often takes the form of networked bilateralism), a
rules-based international order, and the benefits of global integration.69 BRICS representatives have also
defended multilateralism while arguing that its traditional institutional supports need significant
modernization.
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China sought to rebrand its role in the Covid-19 crisis after several months of mismanagement and
misinformation. The country stepped into the void created by the US abdication from multilateralism,
not least by announcing new funding for the WHO following Trump’s decision to halt it. China also
donated and sold medical supplies on several continents and sent medical personal abroad.
Many observers worry about the kind of reglobalization and economic integration that is emerging as
China steps into the void created by the fracturing of postwar traditions of multilateralism and
deepening illiberal nationalisms. For example, Eichengreen raises concerns about a reglobalization that
features illiberal politics and where the rules of a new world order are shaped to fit Chinese
preferences.70 Others worry about forum shopping opportunities while others raise concerns about the
construction of a parallel system at a time of US retreat and expanding global demand for project
finance.71 To be sure, China’s lending raises numerous concerns, particularly its implications for financial
fragility, power over borrowers and control of natural resources, and the carbon footprint of its loans.
The Covid-19 crisis also highlights the obvious fragilities associated with a global supply chain organized
around one country.
But China is not the only actor seeking to recast the international system. There is substantial support
for an unspecified but presumably modernized, heterogeneous, and permissive liberal multilateralism.
French, Canadian, and German heads of state and IMF leadership (starting with former Managing
Director Lagarde) have promoted multilateralism. In addition, the “Democracy 10” (D10) involves senior
officials from a group of leading democracies. The group has been meeting for the past four years once
to twice per year to discuss how to coordinate strategies to advance the liberal world order.72
The chief inference to be drawn at this point, I think, is that the shape of economic integration is being
contested and reshaped. The most likely outcome in the near and medium term involves
deglobalization, reglobalization, and a variety of new forms of economic integration, against a backdrop
of illiberal nationalisms. The latter has been given new life by the exigencies of the Covid-19 crisis, which
has been a gift to illiberal politicians and propagandists the world over. Trump is an exception among
illiberal peers insofar as he suffered electoral defeat for mishandling the Covid-19 and related economic
crises.
The developments discussed above don’t resurrect 20th century embedded liberalism, as it was
theorized then and now, and they do not guarantee any particular outcome concerning the role of the
state in promoting economic and social welfare. But I contend that they do open the door to a
rearticulation of central features of embedded liberalism—especially forms of social protection for
actors whose well-being has been imperiled by the long neoliberal experiment and by the Covid-19
crisis. We might expect a proliferation of diverse embedded liberalisms that take root at multiple levels
via a wide range of instruments. For example, the social protections we associate with embedded
liberalism might be pursued through decidedly non-liberal political means. Indeed, we might posit a
continuum of approaches to the achievement of social protection. At one pole are forms we might easily
recognize as embedded liberalism, with universal protections via democratic, participatory engagement
that is universal in scope but that benefits those most vulnerable to the shocks of international
economic openness. At the other pole we might find something very different—partial rather than
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universal protections, directed at particular constituencies that are tied to nationality, race, and other
identities, which have experienced the damage of neoliberal engagement as an erosion of rights by the
incursion of others who are seen to threaten their claims. I refer to this pole of social protection—
particular and exclusionary — as “embedded populism.” But the present conjuncture of productive
incoherence does not dictate any particular form of social protection. We should indeed expect to see,
and indeed are seeing, the proliferation of diverse and contending forms of social protection across the
liberal-illiberal continuum—even within individual nations.
The US case is particularly illustrative of the many risks associated with incoherence, such as the inability
to manage innocent but damaging spillovers (such as those associated with the return of ultraaccommodative monetary policies), beggar thy neighbor policies, systemic risk, currency and trade
conflicts, and the absence of a federal response to the Covid-19 crisis.73 Indeed, all manner of
destructive incoherence becomes more apparent daily in the US as the Covid-19 crisis unfolds.
Destructive incoherence is also on full display in the failure to develop a coordinated global or even an
EU-wide response to the crisis. That said, many important European states are continuing to hold down
features of the embedded liberalism pole—though even here there are important exceptions, such as
the Macron administration which liberalized the economy and especially labor markets while becoming
Europe’s most powerful champion of multilateralism. However, even Macron changed course as the
Covid-19 crisis developed. As in most European contexts, French policies supported furloughed workers
in ways that were inconceivable in the US. And even Germany moved away from its deficit obsession
early in the Covid-19 crisis. Thus, which countries support the tent poles of embedded liberalism and
how they do so is fluid and evolving.74 We can also situate countries like China, India, and other
developmental states—and even states with more liberal politics, like Chile—at various points along the
continuum reflecting their apparently contradictory mix of liberal and illiberal strategies that inter alia
promote social protection.
Dismal as this account might seem it presents opportunities that may be taken to begin to restore
protections of especially the most vulnerable. The changes in global financial governance surveyed
above provide far more extensive policy space than was available during the neoliberal era that can be
exploited for progressive purposes. Policy space can of course be exploited for regressive ends. But
Hirschman was able to look out on unpromising development terrains and yet hold to his “bias for
hope,” represented so strongly in his commitment to possibilism.75 Hirschman’s possibilism provides a
basis for considering the current incoherence as productive. Incoherence is agnostic and permissive,
opening up opportunities for progress and experimentation even as it induces the risk of regress.
Incoherence also provides the opportunity to shatter shibboleths, such as the neoliberal claim that
budget deficits are necessarily damaging, government direction of economic affairs is necessarily and
always harmful, democratic socialism is just one stop on the road to serfdom, etc. Moreover, Hirschman
urged us to push past easy pessimism since yielding to pessimism could blind us to chances all about us
to achieve meaningful reform. Our rhetoric, Hirschman also reminds us, affects not just what we see,

73

Instead of a federal response to the Covid-19 crisis there was propaganda, denial, and chaos. See Grabel, When
Things Don’t Fall Apart, Chapter 8 on the threats associated with incoherence.
74
Much the same will likely be said about the manner and speed with which tent poles are removed after the
Covid-19 crisis subsides.
75
Albert O. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1971); Albert O. Hirschman, “Political Economics and Possibilism,” in Jeremy Adelman (ed.), The Essential
Hirschman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013[1971]).

17

but also how we intervene, and so has consequential effects in the world.76 Best, then, to err on the side
of potentiality.77
Conclusions
What have we found? The possibilities for embedded liberalism are returning even if the mid-20th
century form has largely passed us by. Nostalgia is not warranted. After all, the American orders were
far from benign. Indeed, the bloody history, harms, and exclusion that indelibly mark the first and
second liberal orders are too often underplayed or even overlooked by their champions.78 The particular
form of 20th century embedded liberalism depended on a unipolar system of global financial governance
that was biased in terms of its benefits and costs – toward the global north, large firms, and other
privileged actors. The new forms of social protection that can arise in the next context of productive
incoherence might be more heterogeneous in forms and effects, but also better suited to the
institutional configurations and needs of diverse countries and diverse social groups. Not all forms
promise to be benign—indeed the nationalist, illiberal impulses in play today suggest that social
protections will be sought via beggar-thy-neighbor strategies, cronyism, racism, misogyny, xenophobia,
propaganda, and other means that offload risk onto weaker parties at home and abroad. These
strategies in fact test the limits of what we mean by liberalism—they may be better characterized as
embedded populism(s).
Examples of embedded populism include the Trump administration’s decision to put American farmers
on welfare, the administration’s decision to cut taxes (with disproportionate benefits for the rich)
without cutting spending, vilifying China, browbeating US corporations into investment decisions that
favor domestic job creation, defending steel tariffs that contravene the market in order to give at least
the illusion of protection to his base, and putting pressure on the Fed to pursue expansionary monetary
policy at a time of relatively strong growth prior to the Covid-19 crisis. Similarly, during the Covid-19
crisis we should take note of the Trump administration’s decision to bail out large firms while starving
state and local governments and hospitals of much needed funds while stirring anti-Asian nativism, and
exploiting historical racism against Blacks and Black Americans. Another example is given by attacks on
central bank independence by Presidents Trump and Erdogan; as is the use of economic sanctions
against Iran. These strategies have nothing to do with neoliberalism, and I therefore reject what is
becoming the common characterization of the Trump (and other backward looking populists) as
neoliberal nationalists.79
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From Polanyi’s perspective, Trump and embedded populism can be understood as a reaction against the
social damage wrought by the pursuit of neoliberal coherence. The neoliberalism and elite-led
globalization of the second American-led order bred resentment among its victims and primed them for
illiberal leaders peddling contrived analyses and solutions. I nonetheless hold that the present
incoherence creates space that was unavailable under neoliberalism. It provides opportunities for varied
forms of re-embeddednesses along with permissive and diverse forms of economic integration.
Incoherent systems create space for experimentation, heterogeneity, and complexity, this despite the
fact that incoherence also creates space for discord, nationalism, racism, and authoritarianism. Polanyi
above all others understood the simultaneity of risks and opportunities. Wisely, he provides us with no
reassuring guarantees.
The original embedded liberalism of the postwar era was based on rules with universal aspirations and
formal multilateral institutions seen as necessary to protect an open international economic order that
had the US at its unquestioned center. Perhaps in light of the uneven changes highlighted in the
discussion above--and in light of the rise of informal governance networks and the networks emerging
among developing economy financial institutions and officials, and between them and the IMF--we
should think more about how to nurture informal and varied networked, cross cutting, messy embedded
liberalisms coexisting in a world marked by many isms. The present period has one thing in common
with the embedded liberal era. Both provide space for national heterogeneity. Today’s permissiveness is
not driven by expert consensus on the importance of heterogeneity and/or the presence of a framework
of multilateralism that supports it.80 Rather it is in the nature of the uncertainty that mark interregnums
that openings emerge for policy autonomy.
Making space for alternative embedded liberalisms necessitates a degree of permissiveness in the
international order—what Rodrik refers to as a “thin versions of globalization.”81 Thin globalization
accepts a collection of diverse national strategies (such as capital controls) whose interactions are
regulated by a set of simple, transparent, and common-sense rules by a range of actors and institutions,
which are themselves representative and inclusive. My claim is that this reconstruction can enable but
by no means assures a restoration of embedded liberal principles. It may well be that thin globalization
is all that is possible or even desirable given the pending conclusion of the era of US hegemony. In this
morbid interregnum there is no singular “ism” or “alternative order,” a fact that I do not mourn.

severely circumscribed by factors such as citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, race, and gender. In contrast
“disembedded populism” would be a rejection of political liberalism and a full bore dismantling of social
protections from market processes and outcomes--neoliberal authoritarianism, perhaps best represented by
Pinochet. Totalitarianism versus authoritarianism in Hayek might map onto the distinction between embedded
populism versus disembedded populism.
80 As of this writing, it is an open question as to whether the incoming Biden-Harris administration will succeed in
its vision of restoring, modernizing, and multilateralizing the US role in international affairs, or will it founder in
nostalgia for a moment that thankfully has passed. See a cautionary treatment of this matter in Peter Beinhart,
“Biden Wants America to Lead the World,” New York Times, December 2, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/opinion/biden-foreign-policy.html).
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